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This paper serves as a response to the assessment methodology of the Basel Committee 
on Banking Supervision to identify systemically important banks. Based on the official 
technique, which requires an extensive collection of bank data, our paper develops a 
practicable modification. Utilising readily available indicators, we determine the 
domestic systemic risk of each licensed bank in Australia in the period 2002-2011. Our 
quantitative results uncover not only high levels of systemic risk for the four major 
banks, but their rising dominance during the global financial crisis. Consequently, we 
introduce a regulatory proposal that enables authorities to reduce the systemic risk of 
individual institutions.
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1. Introduction
Since the beginning of the Global Financial Crisis (GFC), a multitude of academic 
contributions has been devoted to questioning the state of regulation in the global banking
systems and to demanding more rigid responses to the distortions major institutions had 
caused. In the debate on the necessary course of regulation after the GFC, Davis (2009,
p. 455) concluded that the treatment of too-big-to-fail institutions, which might involve the 
granting of implicit and explicit government guarantees as well as negative effects on moral 
hazard and competition, will become a central matter in containing the crisis. In November
2011, the Basel Committee on Banking Supervision (BCBS) finalised its methodology to 
identify such so-called systemically important banks and the regulatory approach to reduce 
the economic impact of their default (BCBS 2011a). Our paper develops a practicable 
modification of the Basel approach and applies this technique to the Australian banking 
system. Additionally, it delivers a regulatory proposal to mitigate the vulnerability of the 
Australian financial system which arises from a failure of one of its Big Four banks.
The ‘indicator-based measurement approach’ of the BCBS (ibid.) provides an assessment 
methodology to define global systemically important banks (G-SIBs) and to calculate the 
additional Common Tier 1 capital that G-SIBs will be mandated to hold (on top of the 
minimum capital charges of Basel III). As a result, the regulators have classified 29 banks as 
G-SIBs, with none of them based in Australia. However, the Group of Twenty (2011, p. 6) 
considers the extension of the G-SIB requirements to domestic systemically important banks 
(D-SIBs). The respective methodology shall be developed by the BCBS together with the 
national authorities and is likely to be adapted from the G-SIB calculation. To date, neither 
the number of D-SIBs in national banking systems nor the official assessment approach has 
been announced. Hence, the extent of domestic systemic risk in the Australian banking system
as well as its relative proportions among institutions remain unclear.
However, both the determination of G-SIBs and D-SIBs require an extensive collection of 
bank data. As most of the necessary figures are only disclosed to the regulatory authorities, a
precise measure of systemic relevance is impractical to a bank’s stakeholders. A continuous
investigation of the official indicators (including sensitive data such as ‘OTC derivatives
notional value’ and ‘level 3 assets’ of every banking institution) appears to be infeasible for 
practitioners, which weakens the degree of transparency of the Basel methodology.
Consequently, in order to predict the systemic risk of a bank and its potential additional equity 
needs, a practicable modification of the official approach is indispensable.
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Computing the domestic systemic importance of banks in international comparison
supposedly yields the most extreme results in the financial system of Australia. Throughout 
the Global Financial Crisis Australian banks proved to be more resilient than others although 
(or rather because?) the systemic relevance of its major banks has been presumably high and 
seemed to have increased even further during the turmoil. One aim of this paper is to 
quantitatively verify those assumptions. The Monthly Banking Statistics (MBS) published by 
the Australian Prudential Regulation Authority (APRA) offers a data collection that enables 
banks’ stakeholders and the general public to modify the BCBS methodology to define G-
SIBs (BCBS 2011a) for use as a measure to classify Australian D-SIBs. In summary, applying 
these publicly available statistics on a monthly basis, our empirical analysis pursues three 
major goals:
(1) The first objective is to adjust the Basel approach by utilising readily available, well 
understood indicators and calculate the domestic systemic risk of every of the 58
licensed banks that submit to APRA. While the qualitative results might be obvious, 
we intend to highlight the quantitative differences and relative proportions of systemic 
importance. In doing so, we provide a practicable and transparent methodology to 
determine the level of systemic risk in the Australian banking market and present the 
likely results of the prospective D-SIB measure envisaged by the BCBS.
(2) We analyse the development of domestic systemic relevance over time and bring to 
light whether there has been a change of the risk that originates from the four major 
banks. Has their systemic importance increased during the crisis?
(3) Lastly, we examine the quantitative results for the Australian banking system and 
assess the incentives for banks which emanate from the BCBS regulation (ibid.). We 
are convinced that regulatory adjustments have to be made on a national level. 
Therefore, we introduce a regulatory scheme that enables Australian authorities to 
significantly reduce the systemic risk caused by the Big Four banks.
The rest of this paper proceeds as follows. The next section illustrates particular 
characteristics of the Australian banking system. Section 3 outlines the methodology of our 
calculation in the style of the ‘indicator-based measurement approach’ of the BCBS. Thereby, 
the official indicators are explained first and the (publicly available) variables employed in 
our valuation are introduced subsequently. Section 4 presents the quantitative results, i.e. the 
current distribution of systemic risk in the Australian banking system as well as its 
development during the Global Financial Crisis. Section 5 is devoted to the regulatory 
implications that arise from our results. Section 6 concludes.
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2. The Australian Banking System: Highly Concentrated, Highly Resilient
During the GFC the Australian banking system has received worldwide attention for its 
resilience and continuous profitability. In international comparison, noticeable characteristics 
can likewise be found in its peculiar market structure. While 58 licensed institutions operate 
in the Australian banking system, i.e. Australian-owned banks, foreign-owned subsidiary 
banks and branches of foreign banks, only four major institutions dominate the market. Before 
the financial crisis in September 2006, the Big Four alone controlled 66 per cent of total 
resident assets and granted about 75 per cent of personal housing loans to Australian 
homeowners. During the global turmoil, the takeovers of St. George Bank and Bank of 
Western Australia, by the majors Westpac and Commonwealth respectively, further increased 
the influence of the Big Four. By September 2011, the four majors held 76 per cent of resident 
assets and accounted for not less than 87 per cent of housing loan approvals.1 To evaluate the 
degree of concentration by international standards, the common CR 5 indicator is applied in 
Figure 1. Focussing on the largest five institutions in selected banking systems, the 
extraordinary dominance of major banks in Australia becomes obvious. For the sake of 
simplicity, the CR 5 can certainly serve as a tentative indicator for the systemic importance of 
institutions.
Figure 1     Concentration Ratio of Top 5 Banks in Selected Countries
(market share in per cent of total assets, year-end 2009)
 
Source: APRA MBS, The Banker (July 2010), FDIC, Japanese Bankers Association, ECB; own calculations.
                                                          
1 All values are taken from the Monthly Banking Statistics of the APRA. 
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While the structure of the Australian banking market is undoubtedly remarkable in 
international comparison, the globally most noticeable characteristic is seen in its profitability 
during the worldwide crisis. Starting in 2007, Australian banks continuously generated the 
highest profits relative to banks of other leading economies. The numbers illustrated in 
Table 1 document the impact of the GFC on each of the selected banking systems and the 
relative stability of the Australian institutions.
Table 1     Pre-Tax Profits of Major Banks
(percentage of total assets)
2003 2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
Australia 1.63 1.48 1.76 1.54 1.42 1.01 0.93 1.14
Canada 1.08 1.23 1.01 1.22 1.12 0.47 0.72 1.01
France 0.68 0.80 0.70 0.73 0.41 0.04 0.18 0.45
Germany 0.04 0.17 0.41 0.43 0.25 -0.46 -0.11 0.17
Italy 0.80 0.87 1.07 1.05 0.88 0.27 0.36 0.37
Japan 0.11 0.26 0.84 0.46 0.29 -0.16 0.29 0.30
Spain 1.61 1.37 1.46 1.37 1.44 1.07 0.88 0.95
United Kingdom 1.24 1.16 0.99 0.90 0.74 -0.05 -0.04 0.25
United States 2.20 1.81 2.06 1.71 0.98 0.28 0.42 1.02
Source: Bank for International Settlements, Annual Reports
 
Both the high extent of concentration as well as the outstanding performance of the Australian 
banking system have raised concerns about an exploitation of market power by the majors and 
about negative implications for the stability of the system as a whole. While the 
interdependency of market power and stability has been discussed extensively in the literature 
(s. Cetorelli 2001, Beck 2008, Schaeck et al. 2009), our contribution focuses on the extent of 
risk that is incorporated in highly concentrated banking systems. Precisely, we intend to 
measure the systemic risk of individual banks in Australia and to offer a regulatory response 
to our quantitative results.
3. Methodology
Next to the common Basel III framework (BCBS 2011b), which is supposed to target all 
banks of the BCBS member countries, the BCBS introduced an additional measure that is 
solely directed at global too-big-to-fail institutions (BCBS 2011a). As the systemic 
consequences of their failure are assumed to be dramatic but unpredictable, large banking 
institutions can expect to be bailed out by their respective governments. In response, the Basel 
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Committee intends to require systemically relevant banks to hold additional common equity 
on top of the general Basel III standards. 
To identify those global systemically important banks, the BCBS selected five categories, 
which are to represent the many dimensions of systemic importance: size, interconnectedness, 
substitutability, complexity and the cross-jurisdictional activity of a bank.2 The extent of 
systemic relevance is expressed by a score that is given to a bank as the sum of its sub-scores 
in the five categories. Thereby, each value is determined by dividing the individual bank 
amount by the aggregate amount for all banks in the sample. With all category scores having 
equal weights, the maximum total score (i.e. if there were only one bank in the system) would 
be 5. Eventually, banks will be grouped into four buckets based on their scores of systemic 
relevance (BCBS 2011a, p. 10 and p. 15). Depending upon the bucket it belongs to, a G-SIB 
will be demanded to hold additional Core Tier 1 capital on top of the minimum capital 
charges of Basel III, which currently varies from 1.0 per cent (lowest bucket) to 2.5 per cent 
(highest bucket) of risk weighted assets. In addition, the BCBS proposes an initially empty 
top bucket of 3.5 per cent surcharge to provide an incentive for banks not to become more 
systemically important. The new requirement will be implemented parallel with the Basel III 
capital conservation and countercyclical buffers, i.e. between 1 January 2016 and year end 
2018, becoming fully effective on 1 January 2019.
Our adjusted methodology to define systemically relevant banking institutions employs the 
exact same technique as the official BCBS approach. The only difference lies in the choice of 
financial indicators which are used to reflect the five categories of systemic relevance. Instead 
of the official variables, which are often disclosed to the regulatory authorities only, we make 
use of publicly available indicators to establish a more practicable calculation. As there is no 
publicly accessible conjoint database for all global banks that incorporates the necessary 
information required by the BCBS, the implementation of such an approach on a global level 
appears to be virtually impossible. However, for the Australian national banking system the 
APRA provides a rich data collection that enables banks and stakeholders to continuously 
assess the (domestic) systemic relevance of institutions. It is our firm conviction that the 
quantitative determination of D-SIBs will become a central element of national banking 
regulation in Australia. By utilising information from the Monthly Banking Statistics we 
                                                          
2 The Basel Committee utilises an indicator-based measurement approach. For regulatory purposes these are 
often favoured over model-based methods, which predominantly employ stock market data that are available for 
listed institutions only and might be subject to volatile expectations. Popular model-based calculations of 
systemic risk include the Conditional Value at Risk (Adrian and Brunnermeier 2010), Marginal Expected 
Shortfall (Acharya 2009) and Shapley-Value (Tarashev et al. 2010). 
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illustrate how a calculation of Australian D-SIBs, following the adjusted BCBS methodology, 
can be conducted.
The individual final score, which announces the systemic risk of a bank, shall be interpreted 
as the degree of distress which occurs in the Australian national banking system given a 
failure of that bank. Interestingly, the Basel Committee did not define a definite threshold 
value to differentiate between systemically important banks and non-systemically important 
ones. Therefore, as a working definition for our analysis, we define a category score value 
higher than 0.1 or a total score higher than 0.5 as tentative thresholds indicating ‘systemic 
importance’. In contrast to the BCBS methodology we put emphasis on the fact that the high 
importance of a bank in one category alone can pose a threat to the system as a whole. 
The categories that constitute our measurement of Australian D-SIBs as well as the respective 
indicators necessary to calculate the individual category scores are presented as follows.
3.1 Size
The size of a financial institution can be regarded as the key measure of systemic risk.3 The 
larger a bank is, the higher is the potential damage that arises from its failure. In that case 
other banks are unlikely to be capable of fully replacing the activities of a major institution. 
Furthermore, the collapse of a well-known bank negatively impacts confidence in the banking 
system as a whole. Hence, the size category illustrates the too-big-to-fail problem, which has 
been theoretically described by Freixas (1999) and Goodhart and Huang (1999). In the BCBS 
method, it is the only category that is expressed by a single indicator. The definition for ‘total 
exposures’ of a bank (as used in the general Basel III framework) is to act as explanatory 
variable for the size of a bank. 
However, the precise calculation of ‘total exposures’ requires both on-balance as well as off-
balance sheet items, which impedes a practicable implementation of the official approach. 
Instead, a common and observable proxy to reflect the total activities of a bank can be found 
in the ‘total assets’ of its balance sheet. The APRA Monthly Banking Statistics, which 
discloses items of the domestic books of Australian banks, publishes the ‘total resident assets’ 
of every licensed institution. Focusing on the domestic business of Australian banks, this 
                                                          
3 Drehmann and Tarashev (2011) demonstrate that ‘size’ (measured by a bank’s liabilities to non-financial 
institutions) alone is a reliable proxy of systemic importance. The official measurement approach of the Basel 
Committee (BCBS 2011a), however, incorporates additional sources of systemic risk and shall instead serve as a 
reference to our proposal. 
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variable (, for every bank i and period j) serves as applicable indicator for our 
calculation.
3.2 Interconnectedness
The interconnectedness of banks can create substantial risks that threaten the stability of the 
financial system. As a troubled institution might not be able to repay its interbank liabilities 
(in full), the likelihood of distress at other institutions increases. Therefore the systemic 
impact of a bank greatly depends on its degree of interconnection with other banks (s. 
Kaufman 1994, as well as Allen and Gale 2000). To measure the score of this category the 
BCBS makes use of three indicators weighted equally. ‘Intra-financial system assets’ as well 
as ‘intra-financial system liabilities’ of a bank do not only report the volumes of loans and 
deposits vis-à-vis other financial institutions, but also the sum of net mark to market reverse 
repos, securities and OTC derivatives traded with other banks. In addition, BCBS includes the 
‘wholesale funding ratio’ of a bank to differentiate between traditional funding by retail 
deposits and short-term refinancing by interbank and money market operations. However, we 
are not quite convinced that the official indicator to reflect wholesale funding, i.e. calculating 
total liabilities less retail funding, is qualified to distinguish between long-term and short-term 
wholesale funding. Besides, we are a bit sceptical that retail funding per se enhances financial 
stability. In periods of systemic distress long-term wholesale financing might be, from an 
economic perspective, more desirable than relying on deposits.
For the reasons named above, we focus on interbank transactions only. The respective items 
in the Monthly Banking Statistics include ‘loans to financial corporations’ (	

) and 
‘deposits from financial corporations’ (
), which are adequate approximations to 
represent the involvement of banks in the Australian interbank activities.
3.3 Non-Substitutability
Moreover, the Basel Committee expects the systemic importance of a bank to be negatively 
related to the substitutability of its services.4 If an institution plays a dominant role in a 
specific business segment or as a provider of market infrastructure, for instance payment 
                                                          
4 The official category name (‘substitutability/financial institution infrastructure’) is somewhat misleading as it is 
the non-substitutability of a bank’s activities that raises the category score and, by this means, the systemic 
relevance of this institution.  
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systems, the substitution by alternative suppliers must be considered unrealistic. 
Consequently, a failure of that bank will not only cause inconvenience for customers in 
seeking the same service at another institution but also increase the degree of distress at other 
banks in terms of service gaps and reduced market liquidity. The respective category score 
introduced by the BCBS is made up of three indicators (equally weighted): ‘assets under 
custody’, ‘payments cleared and settled through payment systems’ and ‘values of 
underwritten transactions in debt and equity markets’.
‘Substitutability’ in the official approach is therefore supposed to reflect the importance of a 
bank as a service provider to other financial institutions. In our modification, the category 
‘non-substitutability’ shall instead express a bank’s relevance to customers outside the 
financial industry with no direct access to money market or capital market funding 
instruments. A high share of loans to these economic sectors indicates a low substitutability of 
the bank and a negative impact on economic activity as alternative sources of funding are 
rare. To guarantee a practicable calculation of the category score, we utilise easily observable 
indicators to picture the dependency of economic sectors from bank capital, i.e. the credit 
volumes granted to households (	
), non-financial corporations (	

), the 
general government (	
	) as well as community service organisations and non-
profit institutions (	
	) as published in the APRA Monthly Banking Statistics.
3.4 Complexity
The next of the official categories accounts for the ‘too-complex-to-fail’ theory, which is 
thoroughly discussed in Herring (2003). The BCBS rightly argues that the systemic risk 
following a bank’s failure is likely to be greater, the more complex its business, structure, and 
operations are. The category score is officially measured by ‘notional value of OTC 
derivatives’, size of assets valuated using non-observable data (‘level 3’) and ‘held for trading 
and available for sale value’. These indicators are to illustrate the number of complex 
agreements a bank has created with different customers, which increase the costs and time 
needed to resolve the bank.
The use of notional values of non-centrally cleared OTC derivatives and not objectively 
priced level 3 assets conflicts with the purpose of our transparent methodology. Instead, 
readily available indicators of every licensed Australian bank can be found in the ‘trading 
securities’, , and ‘investment securities’, 
, as published in the Monthly 
Banking Statistics of APRA. The speculative, short-term assets which are held for trading are 
9
 
subsumed in the ‘trading securities’ of Australian banks. The ‘investment securities’ include 
both ‘financial assets available for sale’ and ‘assets held to maturity’ and can therefore be 
regarded as a more conservative indicator than the official equivalent. However, not only 
trading but also investment securities could come into consideration for fire sales in case an 
institution experiences severe stress. Implicitly, market prices of these securities would 
decline and other banks would be forced to write-down their respective holdings.
In summary, the larger a troubled bank’s portfolio of trading and investment securities is, the 
more likely financial contagion takes place in the total system. The complexity of those 
contracts eventually complicates the final liquidation of that bank. In our calculation, ‘trading 
securities’ and ‘investment securities’ are to represent the complexity of Australian bank 
assets and shall be weighted equally within this category.5
3.5 Domestic Sentiment
The last of the official categories (‘cross-jurisdictional activity’) has been created to express 
the global reach of a bank. In contrast to the BCBS approach, the goal of this paper is to 
define domestic systemically important banks. Hence, we replace the official category by a 
proxy that is to emphasise the domestic relevance of an institution. By choosing ‘deposits 
from households’, , we capture the public perception of the domestic impact that is 
caused by a bank’s failure. The more deposits of households are at risk, the more likely 
worriedness spreads across country, which might involve a general reduction of national 
savings or even bank runs. 
Table 2 opposes the official methodology to identify G-SIBs to our adjusted and practicable 
approach that aims at determining Australian D-SIBs. Whereas the valuation of the five 
categories and of the overall score of a bank is identical, the choice of indicators differs.
Our study covers the period from June 2002 to September 2011 and 98 periodical 
observations accordingly.6 We measure the systemic risk of every licensed Australian bank 
during that period. In summary, the total score (	) which documents the domestic 
systemic importance of a bank i is calculated as follows:
                                                          
5 Pertaining to ‘trading securities‘, absolute values are employed because negative volumes indicate short 
positions that as well raise the number of agreements which need to be dealt with in case of a failure. 
6 We employ monthly data starting in March 2004. Before, the APRA published data on a quarterly basis only. 
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 
  +
                                                                (1)
where n denotes the total number of banks during that period j.
Table 2     Indicators of the Official and Adjusted Approach
 
Category 
(and weighting)
Individual indicator
BCBS approach
(G-SIBs)
Adjusted BCBS approach 
(D-SIBs)
Size (20 %)
Total exposures as defined for use in the 
Basel III leverage ratio
Total resident assets
Interconnectedness
(20 %)
Intra-financial system assets
Intra-financial system liabilities
Wholesale funding ratio
Loans to fin. corporations
Deposits from fin. corporations
Non-Substitutability 
(20 %)
Assets under custody
Payments cleared and settled through 
payment systems
Values of underwritten transactions in 
debt and equity markets
Loans to households
Loans to non-fin. corporations
Loans to the general government
Loans to community service and 
non-profit organisations
Complexity (20 %)
OTC derivatives notional value
Level 3 assets
Held for trading and available for sale
Investment securities
Trading securities
Cross-jurisdictional activity 
(20 %)
Cross-jurisdictional claims
Cross-jurisdictional liabilities
not included
Domestic sentiment 
(20 %)
not included Deposits from households
4. Results
Our key results are presented in two parts. Subsection 4.1 will document the current levels of 
systemic risk in the Australian banking system. To the best of our knowledge, this paper is the 
first contribution which is able to display quantitative values of domestic systemic importance 
in Australia. Subsection 4.2 focuses on the major banks and illustrates how their systemic 
relevance has developed before and during the Global Financial Crisis.
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4.1 Current Distribution of Systemic Importance
Our calculation of systemic importance in the Australian banking system validated the public 
perception: Due to their final scores, the 58 banks that submitted to the APRA in September 
2011 can be classified into two groups: 4 major banks with high systemic impact and 54 
minor institutions with hardly any systemic relevance (see Table 3). Our analysis 
demonstrates that the highest systemic risk originates from the Westpac Banking Corporation 
illustrated by a total score of 1.18. Thus, this single institution accounts for about 23.6 per 
cent of the total system. Likewise, the four major banks show a cumulated total score of 3.81 
and represent not less than 76.2 per cent of the Australian banking system.
Table 3     Systemic Importance of Australian Banks (September 2011)
Rank Institution Name Size Intercon-nectedness
Non-
Substitut-
ability
Complexity Domestic sentiment
TOTAL 
SCORE
1 Westpac Banking Corp. 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.23 1.18
2 Commonwealth Bank 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.27 1.07
3 National Australia Bank 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.84
4 ANZ Banking Group 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.72
5 Bank of Western Australia 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.14
6 Macquarie Bank 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.13
7 Suncorp-Metway 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.12
8 ING Bank (Australia) 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10
9 Bendigo and Adelaide Bank 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09
10 Bank of Queensland 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08
Other 0.12 0.16 0.07 0.16 0.04 0.54
Total sum 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 1.00 5.00
Between the two groups, significant differences in levels can be observed not only pertaining 
to the total scores but also regarding each of the five category scores. The ‘smallest’ major 
bank, the Australia and New Zealand Banking Group, yields a score of systemic relevance 
that is five times as high as the one of the ‘largest’ minor bank, the Bank of Western 
Australia. 
Interestingly, the two systemically most important institutions, Westpac and Commonwealth, 
reached almost identical scores in the categories ‘size’, ‘interconnectedness’ and ‘non-
substitutability’. Yet our study reveals that the higher systemic risk of Westpac stems from its 
extraordinarily large activity in the trading and investment business, i.e. a higher score of 
‘complexity’. Therefore, it is important to note that the ‘size’ category alone, although 
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commonly utilised, is not an adequate proxy of systemic risk, as it is not capable of detecting 
such disparities. The last category (‘domestic sentiment’) shows that 50 per cent of deposits 
provided by households are placed at those two major banks. Only about 20 per cent of 
Australian household deposits are given to banks other than the Big Four. 
It is imperative to emphasise that the already enormous disparity between major and minor 
banks as illustrated in Table 3 actually understates the current proportions in the Australian 
banking system. Although Bank of Western Australia still operates under its own banking 
license, it is a wholly owned subsidiary of Commonwealth Bank of Australia. As a 
consequence, not only the gap between major and minor institutions is in fact larger, but the 
relative systemic importance of the Big Four banks must be regarded even higher in reality 
than displayed in Table 3.
4.2 Development of Domestic Systemic Risk Over Time
Focussing on the major banks, the time series displayed in Figure 2 reveals vital information 
both about the levels and the change of domestic systemic importance in the Australian 
banking system. 
Figure 2     Domestic Systemic Importance of the Australian Major Banks
The most noticeable event is the Westpac takeover of St. George Bank, which was announced 
in May 2008. As the two institutions did not operate with one banking license ab initio, the 
adjustment of the total scores takes place not until March 2010. The takeover of St. George, 
until then ranked no. 5, considerably increased the systemic risk of Westpac and the aggregate 
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domestic importance of the Big Four. Again, it becomes apparent that the size category, 
expressed by the amount of ‘total resident assets’ of a bank, cannot fully reflect the systemic 
relevance of an institution. According to its ‘total resident assets’ Westpac had been regarded 
the fourth largest Australian bank before the takeover took place in 2008. However, our 
investigation brings to light that its systemic importance ranked second at that time already. 
The buy-out of St. George escalated the systemic impact of a potential default of Westpac 
severely. Creating a new maximum value of systemic risk in the Australian banking system, 
the approval of the regulatory authorities seems even more disputable in retrospect.
Regarding the levels of domestic systemic risk, the time series demonstrates that the disparity
between the four major banks and the ‘largest’ minor bank (i.e. St. George Bank until March 
2010 and Bank of Western Australia thereafter) has been persistently high and even increased 
throughout the full time span. However, the most fundamental result of our empirical analysis 
can be found in the development of systemic importance of the Big Four.
We prove for every of the major banks that its systemic relevance has increased relative to its 
initial amount in June 2002. Moreover, even compared to the scores of September 2008, 
which is often referred to as the onset of the Global Financial Crisis, the systemic risk of 
every Big Four bank has risen.7 The absolute gain during the GFC ranges from 0.04 points 
(Commonwealth Bank) to 0.39 points (Westpac) of the total score. Interestingly, the 
acquisition of St. George, having a total score of 0.29 in September 2008, cannot entirely 
explain the total increase in Westpac’s systemic importance. It becomes obvious that the 
actual developments in the Australian banking system run contrary to the goals of the 
international financial regulators, which identified systemic risk as an essential cause of the 
current crisis.
While the general trend towards a higher systemic importance of the major banks is readily 
identifiable during the GFC, the movements before the global crisis require a closer 
examination. Only one year before the collapse of Lehman Brothers the crisis seemed to be a 
national issue of the United States with hardly any impact on the Australian financial system. 
Investigating the period from June 2002 to September 2007, the data seem to indicate a 
reduction of domestic systemic risk among Australian major banks. In the period ex ante the 
GFC, the Commonwealth Bank (-0.09), Westpac (-0.04) as well as the National Australia 
Bank (-0.07) reduced their total score of systemic risk. Only the ANZ Banking Group 
                                                          
7 We interpret the bankruptcy of US investment bank Lehman Brothers, declared in September 2008, as the 
beginning of the Global Financial Crisis. Alternatively, the collapse of the US subprime mortgage industry in 
spring 2007 could be utilised as reference value. In both cases Figure 2 documents the increase in systemic risk 
of Australia’s major banks.
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constantly raised its systemic impact from 2002 to 2007 by 0.11 points. Apparently, the 
relative importance of the majors has decreased before the GFC and began to increase during 
the crisis.
5. Regulatory Implications
Our findings uncovered at least two peculiarities of the Australian banking system that are 
widely recognised as likely causes of systemic distress. First, we observe persistently high 
levels of systemic importance. Four out of 58 banks represent almost 80 per cent of the total 
system. Second, during the Global Financial Crisis, which can be characterised by strong 
public resistance to the operations of too-big-to-fail institutions, our empirical analysis reveals 
a trend towards even higher levels of systemic relevance in Australia.
To make matters worse, for two reasons these results still understate the real extent of 
domestic systemic risk in the Australian banking system. The systemically most important 
institution of the minor banks, Bank of Western Australia, is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Commonwealth Bank. As a result, its total score of 0.14 further increases the actual systemic 
importance of the Big Four.8 Apart from that, the scores published in this paper define the 
degree of distress in a banking system given the default of (exactly) one bank. Hence, the 
BCBS methodology does not account for the problem of ‘too-many-to-fail’, which was 
introduced by Acharya and Yorulmazer (2007): In case of few bank failures, an acquisition by 
surviving institutions is likely. However, when the number of bank failures is large, 
regulatory authorities feel obliged to bail out some or all of the troubled banks. Therefore, 
banks tend to follow similar business models and to build up comparable portfolios of 
securities. Thus, the default of an Australian major bank might likely be accompanied by the 
distress of one or more others. Such herding behaviour cannot be reflected in the scores of our 
underlying approach. In summary, the already alarming results of our empirical investigation 
need to be interpreted as lower limits of domestic systemic risk and are presumably higher in 
reality.
As a consequence of the growing disparity between major and minor banks, the question of 
too-big-to-fail might soon turn into a question of too-big-to-save. The aggregate balance sheet 
                                                          
8 To be correct, the total score of Bank of Western Australia (BWA) cannot be fully added to the score of the 
majors. In our calculation, loans between BWA and Commonwealth are incorporated as loans (of one bank) and 
deposits (of the other) and increase the ‘total assets’ value in both cases. Consequently, the consolidated scores 
of ‘size’, ‘interconnectedness’ and ‘non-substitutability’ would certainly be somewhat lower than the respective 
sum of the two banks. 
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total of the Big Four alone has rapidly increased from 94 per cent of Australian GDP in 1995 
to enormous 193 per cent in 2010.9 With the exception of the United Kingdom, no other 
national banking system in major economies has experienced a comparable expansion of 
banks’ importance.10 We believe that the primary goal of Australian financial regulation 
needs to be a reduction of the systemic importance of the Big Four banks. Next to general 
measures applicable to all licensed banks, such as an intensified competition policy and the 
potential creation of a so-called fifth-pillar bank formed by building societies and credit 
unions, a specific requirement for Australian D-SIBs has to be introduced.
Edgar (2009) notes that regulatory authorities almost exclusively monitor previously 
identified sources of instability, instead of current or potential future indicators. We agree to 
his comment that this course of action is inevitable. The prediction of future crises and its 
likely causes is a challenge authorities cannot overcome. For this reason, we are convinced 
that regulatory adjustments after the GFC have to target the risk of total banking business 
instead of specific (previously harmful) activities. In subsuming the regulatory responses to 
the GFC in the United States, the European Union and the United Kingdom, Eisenbeis (2009) 
highlights the general consensus that higher capital requirements are needed, which are to 
target large and complex rather than smaller institutions. Subsequently, he demands a 
methodology to define such systemically important institutions. Our paper serves in a way as 
a response to Eisenbeis’ contribution as we deliver the technique to determine Australian D-
SIBs and include an additional capital requirement for those large and complex institutions in 
our regulatory proposal.
An increase in the minimum equity ratio is a simple measure that is directed at all types of 
potential bank distress and can be easily applied to a specific group of the banking system 
only. The official BCBS approach to calculate the additional Common Tier 1 capital, which 
G-SIBs will be required to hold, provides a template that could be employed for domestic 
regulatory adjustments in Australia. In fact, the BCBS document advocates additional national 
actions: ‘The Basel Committee emphasises that the additional loss absorbency requirement set 
out above is the minimum level. If national jurisdictions wish to impose a higher requirement 
to their banks, they are free to do so.’ (BCBS 2011a, p. 15). Against the background of no 
Australian major bank being subject to the G-SIBs requirements, we propose a domestic 
                                                          
9 The respective data are taken from the annual reports of the four major banks, while the gross domestic product 
(GDP, current prices) of Australia is obtained from the Australian Bureau of Statistics.
10 For the period 1995-2010, we analysed the ratio of total bank assets to GDP in the Group of Seven countries 
and Australia. Employing the ‘Annual National Accounts’ and ‘Bank Profitability Statistics’ of the OECD, the 
increase of the Australian ratio during the period is only exceeded by the UK equivalent. 
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regulatory approach. By adopting the technique of the official G-SIBs regulation and applying 
the data of our D-SIBs calculation, our recommendation consists of two crucial elements:
(1) To lower the enormous systemic risk arising from single institutions, Australian D-
SIBs need to hold additional Common Tier 1 capital on top of the standards set by 
Basel III. Furthermore, in case there will be Australian G-SIBs in the future, our
proposals shall be implemented in addition to the international capital requirements. 
The total scores measured to define D-SIBs in the Australian banking system can be 
utilised to determine the extent of additional capital the respective bank is subject to. 
As our results indicate a maximum value of 1.18 (i.e. Westpac), institutions shall be 
given an incentive not to exceed higher levels. Banks with individual scores beyond 
1.20 could be mandated to hold additional Common Equity of 2.0 per cent of risk-
weighted assets. An incentive to lower the current domestic score of a bank in the long 
run is established by a threshold value of 0.50 and a respective capital requirement of 
1.0 per cent. In contrast to the static surcharges of the BCBS proposal, we prefer a 
proportional obligation as a function of the individual D-SIB score to generate realistic 
incentives in the short run. Within the range of 0.50 to 1.20 higher scores imply higher 
capital needs, while lower values require lower amounts of equity. For instance, a total 
score of 0.85 would indicate 1.5 per cent of additional equity, a value of 0.84 signifies 
a surcharge of 1.49 per cent etc.
(2) In order to put emphasis on the long-term goal of 0.50, the threshold values need to be 
decreased over time. The degree of reduction is not to represent an additional penalty 
and shall reflect a realistic process of adjustment. As three major banks lowered their 
scores between 2002 and 2007 by 0.09 (Commonwealth), 0.04 (Westpac) and 0.07 
points (NAB) on their own accord, a decrease of 0.05 points every 5 years seems to be 
an adequate modification of threshold values.
6. Conclusion
This article is to introduce a practicable methodology to determine domestic systemically 
important banks in Australia. Based on the official BCBS approach to define global systemic 
important institutions, our technique enables banks and its stakeholders to approximate the 
quantitative levels and the relative proportions of systemic risk in the Australian banking 
system. The results of our analysis do not only uncover high current levels of domestic 
systemic risk for the four major banks, but also a trend towards even higher levels in the 
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future. Thus, we believe that the problem of banks being too-big-to-fail will soon turn into a 
question of too-big-to-save. As we found indications that the systemic risk of the Big Four 
actually declined before the global crisis, future research should clarify to what extent the 
GFC had caused the major banks to become even more dominant.
Although the probability of a default of a Big Four bank appears to be low at this time, the 
potential consequences are very likely to be ruinous. Our quantitative results indicate the
dependency of the Australian economy from four financial institutions and the obvious 
necessity of additional national regulatory measures.
We regard an increase in the minimum equity ratio as the essential requirement of future 
regulation as it affects the risk of total banking business instead of specific, supposedly 
harmful, activities. Certainly, the exact threshold values of systemic relevance as well as the 
recommended timeline of their modifications are debatable. However, the message of 
regulatory adjustments in the Australian banking system has to be unambiguous, i.e. an 
obvious ambition to lower the systemic relevance of single institutions. The public discontent 
with major bank dominance and the encouragement by the BCBS to impose additional 
national standards represent an opportunity to finally target the might of the Big Four. 
Responding during the next post-boom crisis might be too late.
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Appendix
 
Table A1     Systemic Importance of Australian Banks (Total Sample, September 2011)
Rank Institution Name Size Intercon-nectedness
Non-
Substitut-
ability
Complexity Domestic sentiment
TOTAL 
SCORE
1 Westpac Banking Corp. 0.22 0.21 0.23 0.29 0.23 1.18
2 Commonwealth Bank 0.22 0.22 0.22 0.16 0.27 1.07
3 National Australia Bank 0.17 0.18 0.19 0.16 0.14 0.84
4 ANZ Banking Group 0.15 0.17 0.16 0.10 0.15 0.72
5 Bank of Western Australia 0.03 0.02 0.04 0.02 0.03 0.14
6 Macquarie Bank 0.02 0.03 0.01 0.05 0.01 0.13
7 Suncorp-Metway 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.03 0.03 0.12
8 ING Bank (Australia) 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.02 0.04 0.10
9 Bendigo and Adelaide Bank 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.04 0.09
10 Bank of Queensland 0.01 0.00 0.02 0.01 0.03 0.08
11 JPMorgan Chase Bank, NA 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.02 0.00 0.04
12 UBS AG 0.01 0.02 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.04
13 HSBC Bank Australia Limited 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.01 0.01 0.04
14 Deutsche Bank AG 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
15 Citigroup Pty Limited 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.03
16 The Royal Bank of Scotland 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.03
17 Rabobank Australia Limited 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.02
18 Citibank, N.A. 0.01 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
19 Royal Bank of Canada 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
20 State Street Bank and Trust 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
21 BNP Paribas 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.02
22 Mizuho Corporate Bank, Ltd. 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
23 Bank of China Limited 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
24 Bank of Tokyo-Mitsubishi UFJ 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
25 AMP Bank Limited 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
26 Members Equity Bank Pty Ltd. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.02
27 Bank of America, NA 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
28 Sumitomo Mitsui Banking Corp. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
29 The HSBC Limited 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
30 Lloyds TSB Bank plc 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.01 0.00 0.01
31 United Overseas Bank Limited 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
32 C. C. Raiffeisen-Boerenleenbank 0.01 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
33 Oversea-Chinese Banking Corp. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
34 ING Bank N.V. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
35 MECU Limited 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
36 Rural Bank Limited 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
37 The Royal Bank of Scotland NV 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
38 Investec Bank (Australia) Ltd. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
39 Barclays Bank PLC 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.01
40 Credit Suisse AG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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41 Bank of Cyprus Australia Ltd. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
42 Beirut Hellenic Bank Ltd 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
43 Arab Bank Australia Limited 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
44 Bank of Scotland plc 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
45 WestLB AG 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
46 China Construction Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
47 Mega International Commercial 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
48 Ind. and Comm. Bank of China 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
49 Bank of China (Australia) Ltd. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
50 The Northern Trust Company 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
51 State Bank of India 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
52 Taiwan Business Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
53 First Commercial Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
54 Taiwan Cooperative Bank, Ltd 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
55 Societe Generale 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
56 Standard Chartered Bank 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
57 The Bank of New York Mellon 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
58 BNP Paribas Securities Services 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
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